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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellants, Redwood Industries and
Zurich Insurance Company, is from a final order of the Labor
Commission of Utah dated March 29, 2 0 1 1 . This Court h a s jurisdiction
over this appeal p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a),
63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2011).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW: Is the Commission's Order on Motion for
Review a n d Order Motion Denying Request for Reconsideration in
error since it applied a "direct and natural consequences" legal
analysis w h e n the facts of the case reveal t h a t Petitioner was
involved in two industrial accidents, requiring application of a
different legal standard.
Standard of review:
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (4)(d), the Court of Appeals

may grant relief from an agency action if the agency "has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law." Whether an agency h a s properly
interpreted or applied agency-specific law is reviewed for correctness.
Harrington v. Industrial Comm'n, 942 P.2d 9 6 1 , 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);

1
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Terry v. Ret Bd., 2007 UT App 87, \7 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Drake v.
Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

2.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW

Did the Commission err in finding that the

February 17, 2006 event was not a n industrial accident, but rather
was simply a n aggravation of the April 2 1 , 2001 primary industrial
injury.
Standard of review:
To successfully challenge findings of fact m a d e in a n administrative
proceeding, the party seeking to u p s e t the findings m u s t show that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence w h e n viewed in light
of the whole record before the court. See Intermountain

Health Care v.

Board of Rev., 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
1

<

2
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah
"Workers Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers'
compensation for industrial accidents. This section r e a d s as follows:
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who
is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment, wherever
s u c h injury occurred, if the accident was not
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . .
compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury . . . s u c h a m o u n t for medical, n u r s e , and
hospital services . . . [and] medicines . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2001).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case p r e s e n t s the question whether the Utah Labor
Commission applied the correct law to this case, utilizing a direct and
natural consequences analysis, when Mr. Phillips w a s involved in two
industrial accidents.

S t a t e m e n t of Facts and Course of t h e Proceedings
1.

Shawn Phillips, (hereinafter "Petitioner"), injured his low back while
working for Redwood Industries on April 2 1 , 2001 when he twisted
while carrying a n 80 pound compressor u p a flight of stairs. (R.,
00396 at 6, 35).

2.

He eventually moved to Ohio where he r e t u r n e d to work at regular
duty a s a refrigeration technician for a new employer, A-1
Refrigeration. (R., 00396 at 12). While working for his new
employer in Ohio, Mr. Phillips re-injured his back on February 17,
2006 while manipulating a 70 pound ladder. (R., 00396 at 12-13,

*

26-27). A gust of wind caught the ladder Petitioner was holding
erect causing low back and thoracic injuries. Petitioner h a s not be
able to work since t h a t accident. (R., 00396 at 31).

i
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3.

On December 15, 2006 Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing
seeking worker's compensation benefits arising from the April 20,
2001 accident with Redwood Industries.

4.

(R., 1-9).

Redwood Industries and its worker's compensation carrier, Zurich
Insurance Company (hereinafter, collectively "Redwood") filed an
Answer to the Application for Hearing. (R., 16-17). Redwood
denied t h a t the industrial accident of April 20, 2001 was causative
of his current medical problems. Redwood argued that the
Petitioner suffered a subsequent industrial event on February 17,
2006 while employed for a new employer which was causative of
any current disability or need for medical treatment. (R., 16-17).
An evaluation by Gerald Moress, M.D., supported Redwood's
position (R., 14-21 ). Dr. Moress concluded t h a t the Ohio industrial
accident permanently aggravated the Petitioner's prior back
problem.

5.

An evidentiary hearing was held on this matter on May 2 1 , 2007.
(R., 00396).

6.

Following this, the Administrative Law J u d g e issued Interim
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order remitting the case
to a medical panel. (R., 285-287).

5
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On November 2, 2007 the medical panel issued its report. (R., 317323). The medical panel opined that Petitioner w a s not yet
medically stable from the April 20, 2001 accident. However, the
medical panel did not opine (nor was it asked to opine) on the issue
of apportionment of medical expenses among each of the industrial
accidents.
On February 5, 2008, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law a n d Order (the "ALJ's Order") finding that the
accident on April 20, 2001 was responsible for all medical and
indemnity compensation. (R., 325-338). The ALJ applied
McKesson v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) in
applying a direct a n d n a t u r a l consequence analysis to this case,
despite this case involving two industrial accidents. See id..
Applying McKesson methodology, the ALJ ruled t h a t the
s u b s e q u e n t February 1, 2006 industrial accident was not the result
of a n intentional or negligent act by Petitioner, and concluded that
Petitioner's l u m b a r back pain after the February 17, 2006 accident
was the n a t u r a l result of his industrial injury of April 1, 2 0 0 1 .
See id.

6
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9.

On March 4, 2008 Redwood filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's
Order. (R., 338-348).

10.

Petitioner filed a response on March 24, 2008. (R., 349-361).

11.

On J a n u a r y 27, 2011 the Commission entered a n Order on Motion
for Review affirming the ALJ's Order and also applying McKesson v.
Labor Commission, despite the fact that this case involves two
industrial accidents. (R., 369-373).

12.

On February 14, 2011 Redwood filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
(R., 374-381).

Redwood argued that the ALJ a n d Commission

erred in its application of the law in this case in applying McKesson
v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) since this
case involves two industrial accidents rather t h a n a compensable
industrial accident followed by a non-industrial accident or episode
which was the crux of the McKesson decision. Respondents
submitted t h a t the proper law applicable when there are two
industrial accidents is U.S.F.&, G v. Industrial Commission,

657 P.2d

764 (Utah 1983) and its progeny for evaluation of medical expenses
and Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and in
Duane Brown Chevrolet v. Industrial Commission,

511 P.2d 743

(Utah 1973) with respect to indemnity compensation. See id.
7
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13.

On March 29, 2 0 1 1 , the Commission entered its Order Denying
Request for Reconsideration. (R., 392-304). The Commission
concluded t h a t the s t a n d a r d articulated in McKesson

applied

despite the s u b s e q u e n t event in 2006 being a n industrial accident.
14.

Following this, Respondents filed a Petition for Review on April 12,
2011.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission erred in applying a direct and n a t u r a l
consequences analysis - applying McKesson v. Labor Commission,

41

P.3d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). First, the Commission erred in finding
that the February 2006 event while Petitioner worked for A-l did not
qualify as a s u b s e q u e n t industrial accident.

The u n d i s p u t e d evidence

shows that Petitioner filed for worker's compensation benefits due to this
second accident which occurred in the workplace. On this basis, the
ALJ's factual findings constitute reversible error.
In addition, the Commission erred in applying McKesson's

direct

and natural consequences analysis to this case. McKesson and its
progeny applies to cases involving a compensable industrial episode
followed by a non-industrial accident or aggravation. The present case is
not analogous a n d is not subject to the McKesson direct and natural
consequences rule since the second event in February 2006 was an
industrial accident. The correct standard to be applied in this case with
regard to Petitioner's claim for medical expenses is U.S.F.& G v. Industrial
Commission, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) and Duane Brown Chevrolet v.
Industrial Commission,

511 P.2d 743 (Utah 1973) with regard to the

extent of ongoing indemnity liability.

9
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ARGUMENT
THE LABOR COMMISSIONS ORDER MUST BE REVERSED SINCE IT
INCORRECTLY APPLIED A "DIRECT AND NATURAL CONSEQUENCE"
ANALYSIS.
The Utah Labor Commission's Order on Motion for Review and
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration m u s t be reversed given the
incorrect legal analysis applied by the Commission.
A.

The Commission Erred in Ruling that Petitioner
Sustain Two Industrial
Accidents.

Application of McKesson v. Labor Commission,

Did Not

2002 UT App 10, 41

P.3d 468 is inapplicable in this case since Petitioner sustained two
industrial accidents. Respondents submit t h a t in s u c h cases, U.S.F &, G.
v. Industrial Commission,

657 P.2d 764, 767 (Utah 1983) applies to allow

for possible apportionment of medical expenses among industrial
accidents. Under the correct law, remittal to a medical panel is
appropriate to evaluate apportionment.
In its Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
held that (1) McKesson's

direct and n a t u r a l consequences analysis is not

limited to s u b s e q u e n t non-industrial

aggravations and; (2) the second

event in 2006 does not qualify as an "separate compensable injury" b u t
rather was simply a n aggravation of a primary injury. The Commission
briefly stated:
10
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Redwood argues t h a t the standard in McKesson does not
apply to Mr. Phillips's claim because McKesson involved a
non-industrial aggravation of a compensable industrial injury.
However, there is nothing in McKesson limiting its application
to non-industrial aggravations as opposed to those occurring
in the workplace. Mr. Phillips sustained a compensable
injury in 2001 while working for Redwood. Then, in 2006,
Mr. Phillips aggravated the same injury. The undisputed
evidence shows Mr. Phillips did not sustain a separate
compensable injury, b u t merely aggravated the primary injury
for which Redwood remains liable. The Commission finds that
the McKesson s t a n d a r d applies to Mr. Phillips claim and
confirms its previous decision.
(R., 393). No further analysis is had by the Commission.
Redwood first submits that the Commission's factual findings are
erroneous. The evidence at hearing as testified by Petitioner clearly
indicated that the accident in February 2006 occurred while Petitioner
was working at A-1 Refrigeration in Ohio when he was holding u p an
extension ladder which was caught by the wind, causing Petitioner to
twist and toss the ladder. R., 00396 at 13, 26-31. In fact, the ALJ noted
the details of this industrial episode in his Order. R., 329. Accordingly,
contrary to the Commission's findings, the second event was not a "nonindustrial" episode. Clearly it was an industrial accident and in fact,
Petitioner filed for worker's compensation benefits based upon that
accident. On this basis, the Commission's findings m u s t be reversed on
this point since other evidence supports a contrary finding.

11
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JB.

Application
of McKesson is Inapplicable
When a
Sustains a Subsequent Industrial
Accident.

Worker

The facts of this case reveal that Petitioner was involved in two
industrial accidents which both involved back injuries to his lumber
spine. 1 The first accident with Redwood Industries occurred on April 20,
2001 when he was carrying a n 80 pound compressor u p three flights of
stairs and twisted, injuring his low back. 2 Following this accident,
Petitioner returned to work in 2003 in Pennsylvania. The second
industrial accident occurred on February 17, 2006 while working for A-1
Refrigeration in Ohio w h e n a gust of wind caught a 70 p o u n d fiberglass
ladder Petitioner was holding erect causing an aggravation of his low
back condition a n d also new thoracic injuries. R., 329. Petitioner h a s
not worked since the 2006 accident.
One of the issues presented for review to the Commission was
whether apportionment of medical expenses applies in this case, given
t h a t Petitioner was involved in multiple industrial accidents, warranting
application of U.S.F.& G v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah
1983) rather t h a n McKesson.

Redwood submits t h a t the Commission's

1

The February 2006 event also caused injury to his thoracic spine as
noted by Dr. Neuendorf.
2

Following this accident, Petitioner underwent low back surgery on
J a n u a i y 3, 2003 by Dr. Reed Fogg. R., 395 at 166.
12
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Order on Motion for Review and its Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration incorrectly apply a direct and n a t u r a l consequences
analysis outlined in McKesson v. Labor Commission,

2002 UT App 10,

instead of the appropriate analysis u n d e r U.S.F.&, G.
McKesson and its progeny are not the applicable legal standard
when a claimant is involved in multiple industrial accidents. Rather,
McKesson is applicable only when there is an initial compensable
industrial accident followed by a non-industrial event or aggravation.
Such is not the case here. Indeed, McKesson does not apply when the
court is evaluating liability between multiple industrial accidents.
The Utah Court of Appeals held in McKesson Corporation vs. Labor
Commission:
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a
s u b s e q u e n t aggravation to a compensable work
place injury, a claimant need only prove t h a t his
s u b s e q u e n t injury is a natural result of his
compensable primary injury. [Footnote] Stated
more precisely, the claimant m u s t establish t h a t
the s u b s e q u e n t aggravation is causally linked to
the primary compensable injury. Furthermore, a
claimant need not show that his original tragedy
was the sole cause of his subsequent injury.
Indeed, if the claimant can show that the initial
work related accident is merely a contributing
cause of this subsequent injury, the claimant h a s
met his burden.
McKesson v. Labor Commission,

2002 UT App 10, 41 P.3d 468.
13
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In McKesson, the Court held that a claimant's s u b s e q u e n t non
industrial injury to his neck while entering his own motor vehicle was
the direct and n a t u r a l consequence of his initial primary injury and,
therefore, awarded additional workers' compensation benefits. In t h a t
case, the claimant h a d sustained a compensable h e a d injury after being
struck in the head by a 14-pound case and suffered two herniated discs.
Following t h a t accident, the claimant attempted to pull himself u p into
his pick-up truck a n d hit his head on the truck's door frame, aggravating
his neck injury. The employer argued t h a t this s u b s e q u e n t nonindustrial accident essentially broke the chain of medical causation,
relieving the employer of additional workers' compensation benefits. The
Commission and the Court of Appeals disagreed a n d found t h a t the
subsequent injury occurred after a "simple accident brought on by
ordinary error and unintentional miscalculation." Thus, the Commission
concluded that the s u b s e q u e n t non-industrial injury was a n a t u r a l result
of his compensable work place injury, insufficient to relieve the employer
of financial responsibility. The Court held t h a t nothing in the record
suggested that the claimant's s u b s e q u e n t injury resulted from
"unreasonable conduct".

14
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There is overwhelming Utah Labor Commission precedent stating
that McKesson does not apply when the court is evaluating liability
among two industrial accidents. The following sampling of Utah Labor
Commission cases shows this application:
In My haver v. ASAP Organization, Labor Commission Case No. 0 3 0843 (May 9, 2006), the Utah Labor Commission specifically held that
McKesson!s direct a n d n a t u r a l consequences analysis does not apply
when the case presents with two work related injuries. In Myhaver, the
claimant attempted to argue that McKesson applied and did not allow
apportionment between employers. However, the Commission found the
claimant's a r g u m e n t incorrect and stated:
However, McKesson dealt with a different issue — whether a
worker who h a s suffered a first work related injury is entitled
to additional benefits for a subsequent non-industrial
aggravation of the primary injury. McKesson did not deal
with the situation presented here of two work related injuries,
each compensable in its own right, which act together to
necessitate medical treatment.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in U.S.F &, G. v. Industrial
Commission, 657 P.2d 764, 767 (Utah 1983) is more closely
relevant to Mr. Myhaver's circumstances. In U.S.F. & G., the
worker had two accidents while employed by the same
employer, b u t the employer had different insurance carriers
at the time of each accident. The Industrial Commission
apportioned liability for medical care between the two
carriers. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted
apportionment u n d e r s u c h circumstances, [*5] b u t
remanded the case for the Industrial Commission to obtain a
15
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medical panel opinion as to w h a t the proper apportionment
should be.
In Mr. Myhaver's case, J u d g e Sessions' apportionment is
based on a medical panel opinion, thereby satisfying the
objection t h a t prompted a r e m a n d in U.S.F. & G. And
although U.S.F. & G. dealt with apportionment between
two insurance carriers, t h e Commission s e e s n o reason
why t h e same principle should not apply b e t w e e n two
employers.
2006 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 50, 4-5 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2006). See also
Powers v. Providian Financial, Labor Commission Case No. 04-0829 (Jan.
20, 2006) (applying McKesson to s u b s e q u e n t non-industrial accidents
only).
Likewise, in Moloney v. Highland Care Center, Labor Commission
Case No. 00-1084 (June 30, 2003), the Commission noted that a direct
and natural consequences analysis does not apply w h e n there are two
industrial accidents. There, the claimant h a d one industrial accident in
Utah in 2000 a n d another out-of-state in 1994. There, Commission held:
The Commission also notes Highland's final a r g u m e n t t h a t
J u d g e H a n n should have determined whether Ms. Maloney's
accident of May 6, 2000, was "a direct a n d n a t u r a l
consequence of the earlier 1994 accident/' The Commission
believes t h a t Highland's argument is based on a
misinterpretation of the Utah Court [*7] of Appeals recent
decision in McKesson v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 4 6 8 (Utah
App. 2002), a s well a s the Commission's previous decisions.
But in any event, the medical panel's report establishes that
there is no connection between the two accidents.
Consequently, even if the "direct a n d natural" test were
16
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applicable here, which it is not, the second accident cannot
be viewed a s the direct and natural consequence of the first
accident.
2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 149 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2003).
The Commission also held similarly in DeMille v. Thurston
Labor Commission Case No. 00-1059 (May 30, 2003), t h a t

Cable,

McKessorts

direct and natural consequences analysis does not apply when there are
two industrial accidents. There the claimant injured his back in a work
related accident with Thurston Cable Construction on September 14,
1995. The court noted he had a prior work related injury before working
for Thurston which warranted a 17% permanent partial disability.

The

Commission held:
Although Thurston cites the Utah Court of Appeals' recent
decision in McKesson v. Lieberman, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App.
2002) to support its argument, McKesson involved a non-work
aggravation of a work-related injury. The Court of Appeals 1
analysis of that situation is not applicable t o a case such
as this, where there have been two separate work
accidents, the last of which removes the worker from the
workforce.
2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 87 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2003).
This principle is also reiterated in Nelson v. Northwest

Transport,

Labor Commission Case No. 01-0068, 01-0069 (May 1, 2003). There, the
Commission first evaluated if there were two industrial accidents. The
Commission opined that there was only one compensable accident.
17
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Therefore, the Commission found it appropriate to apply McKesson v.
Labor Commission to a d d r e s s the extent of t h a t employer's continuing
liability.
The direct a n d n a t u r a l consequences rule t h a t h a s been adopted by
the Court in McKesson,

is taken from Intermountain

Health Care v. Board

of Rev., 839 P.2d 8 4 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Mountain States Casing v.
McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) 3 . Both of these cases draw from
Professor Larson's Treatise, Larsons on Worker's Compensation Law
which appears to limit the "direct and natural consequences rule" to
cases when there is a compensable industrial accident followed by a nonindustrial aggravation or new non-industrial injury. See

Intermountain

Health Care v. Board of Rev., 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Larsons on Worker's Compensation § 13.11, currently codified at § 10.01
et seq.). This treatise fails to cite any case where the direct and natural
h a s been applied in multiple industrial accident cases.

3

In Mountain States Casing v. McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) the
Court applied a direct and n a t u r a l consequences rule analysis when
claimant suffered new injury at home to his hand. In McKean, the court
held that the s u b s e q u e n t event at home while doing day-to-day activities,
causing a h a n d blister, was compensable due to the first accident since
there was no evidence of any negligent or intentional misconduct to break
the chain of causation.
18
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Despite the overwhelming precedent at the Commission level and
in Professor Larson's treatise, the Commission ruled, in part, that "there
is nothing in McKesson limiting its application to non-industrial
aggravations a s opposed to those occurring in the workplace." (R., 393).
However, the Commission's ruling is clearly contrary to Labor
Commission precedent and leading worker's compensation treatises from
which the direct a n d n a t u r a l consequences rule stems. Although
McKesson does not directly state that it is limited to compensable
accidents followed by non-industrial

aggravations, it is evident that the

Commission h a s applied it a s such in its past rulings and Professor
Larson's treatise limits its application to non-industrial aggravations.
The correct legal s t a n d a r d for the present case involves application
of U.S.F.& G v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) which
was completely omitted from the Commission's analysis. Indeed, in
U.S.F.& G the Utah Supreme Court evaluated liability to a claimant's
neck injury a s a result of four separate industrial accidents. The Court
concluded that while liability cannot be apportioned among insurance
carriers in multiple accident cases, medical expenses can be
apportioned. The court ruled that a subsequent industrial accident does
not relieve the initial employer of the obligation to bear expenses that

19
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remain attributable to the prior injury.

Accordingly, the Court found it

appropriate to appoint a medical panel to "determine the percentage of
impairment attributable to the various accidents." Id.
The Commission erred in failing to apply U.S.F.&, G v. Industrial
Commission, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) in this case to the evaluation of
medical expenses a n d erred in refusing to remit this matter to a panel to
review apportionment among accidents. Indeed, there is overwhelming
precedent applying U.S.F.& G when a case involves multiple industrial
accidents. See S.M.J, v. Geneva Steel, Case No. 99-0010 ( 9 / 2 5 / 0 2 ) ;
Larkin v. Gibbons & Reed Co., Case No. 94-0740 ( 1 1 / 2 6 / 9 5 ) , 1996 UT
Wrk. Comp. Lexis 9 1 . For example, in SMJ, the Commission held t h a t
U.S.F.&G. applies to apportion medical expenses

between a n original

injury and s u b s e q u e n t industrial aggravation and Duane Brown applies
to the evaluation of liability for disability compensation

involving multiple

industrial accidents.
With regard to indemnity benefits, the applicable legal s t a n d a r d s
are properly articulated in both Allen v. Industrial Commission,
15 (Utah 1986) 4 a n d in Duane Brown Chevrolet v. Industrial
4

729 P.2d
Commission,

The Allen decision evaluates whether the claim is initially
compensable, not the extent of liability.
Once compensability is
established, additional compensability for indemnity is evaluated under the
20
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511 P.2d 743 (Utah 1973), the latter which evaluates the extent of
liability 5 . Under Allen, the court evaluates both legal causation and
medical causation for these accidents. Moreover, in Duane Brown the
Court stated t h a t indemnity compensation for the s a m e period of time
cannot be apportioned among multiple insurers. There, the Court found
that the last injury aggravated the prior disability and, therefore, was
fully liable for disability compensation. Given t h a t the claimant's
February 2006 accident aggravated his prior disability a n d Petitioner h a s
not worked gainfully since the 2006 event, any award for ongoing
indemnity should be found attributable to the 2006 industrial event. We
ask the Court to reverse the Commission's Order a n d r e m a n d this case
for proper application of the law.

Duane Brown standard.
5

See S.M.J, v. Geneva Steel, Case No. 99-0010 ( 9 / 2 5 / 0 2 ) (holding that
USF&G applies to apportion medical expenses between original injury and
subsequent industrial aggravation and Duane Brown applies to the
evaluation of liability for disability compensation involving multiple industrial
accidents).
21
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Commission's Order and
remand this m a t t e r to the Commission for application of the proper legal
standard.

A

Respectfully submitted this

33"'-l

day of fiYi\&^

2011

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

lorrfas C. Sti
iturd
Krisfy L. Bertelsen
Attorneys for Appellants
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor
P O B o x 146615
Salt Lake City UT 84114
(801)530-6800

SHAWN P. PHILLIPS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 06-1154

REDWOOD INDUSTRIES and/or
ZURICH INSURANCE CO.,

Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,

HEARING:

Room 336 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on May 21, 2007. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Shawn P. Phillips, was present and represented by his
attorney Melvin A. Cook Esq.
The respondents, Redwood Industries and Zurich Insurance Co., were
represented by attorney Thomas Sturdy Esq.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The petitioner, Shawn P. Phillips, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on December 15, 2006, and claimed entitlement to payment of the following
workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care; (3)
temporary total disability compensation; (4) temporary partial disability compensation; (5)
permanent partial disability compensation, and; (6) reimbursement for travel expenses. Mr.
Phillips's claim for workers' compensation benefits arose out of an industrial accident that
occurred on April 20, 2001.
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The respondents accepted liability for Mr. Phillips' April 20, 2001 industrial accident with
Redwood Industries but claimed they paid Mr. Phillips all workers' compensation benefits owed
to him. Respondents denied that the industrial accident on April 20, 2001 medically caused Mr.
Phillips' current medical problems. Rather, the respondents argued that Mr. Phillips suffered a
subsequent industrial accident on February 17, 2006 while employed for A-l Refrigeration in
Ohio causing any current disability or need for medical treatment.
I. ISSUES.
1.

Did the industrial accident of April 20, 2001 at Redwood Industries or the industrial
accident on February 17, 2006 at A-l Refrigeration cause Shawn Phillips' current
medical problems and disability at issue in this case?

2.

Do the respondents owe Shawn Phillips any additional temporary total disability
compensation?

3.

Do the respondents owe Shawn Phillips any temporary partial disability compensation?

4.

Do the respondents owe Shawn Phillips any additional permanent partial disability
compensation?

5.

What medical treatment is reasonable and necessary to treat Shawn Phillips' current
medical problems, if any, caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident?
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Mr. Phillips filed his Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission on December 15,
2006. I held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on May 21, 2007. I issued my Interim
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Interim Order) on August 28, 2007. Also on
August 28, 2007 I sent the parties my proposed medical panel referral and allowed them 15 days
to file any objections to the form of the referral. Neither party objected to the proposed medical
panel referral.
I referred the outstanding medical issues in this case to the appointed Medical Panel on October
2, 2007. The Medical Panel filed a report on November 13, 2007. I sent the Medical Panel
Report to the parties on November 15, 2007 and allowed them 15 days to file any objections to
the admissibility of the report. Neither party filed any objections to the Medical Panel Report.
Therefore, I admitted the Medical Panel Report into evidence without objection.
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IV. FINDINGS OF FACT.
A.

Employment.

The respondent Redwood Industries employed Mr. Phillips on April 20, 2001.
B.

Compensation Rate.

As of April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips was married with two dependent children. No dispute existed
that Mr. Phillips's compensation with Redwood Industries on April 20, 2001 equaled $24.00 per
hour, 40 hours per week average, yielding the maximum temporary total disability compensation
rate of $631.00 per week and the maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate of
$421.00 per week. [$24.00/hour x 40 hours/week = $960.00/wek x 2/3 = $640.00/week].
C.

April 20, 2001 Industrial Accident.

Mr. Phillips7 testimony provided the undisputed evidentiary account of his injury on April 21,
2001. While at work for Redwood Industries at the Kennecott Acid Plant on April 21, 2001 Mr.
Phillips carried an 80 pound compressor1 up three flights of stairs. As he carried the compressor
up the stairs an apprentice yelled at Mr. Phillips causing him to twist around while carrying the
compressor and hurting his low back. When Mr. Phillips felt the pain in his low back as he
twisted he dropped the compressor and fell to his knees.
Mr. Phillips immediately reported the low back injury to his supervisor at Redwood Industries.
Following the events of April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips took several days off of work. Mr. Phillips
returned to work at full duty because Redwood Industries had no light duty work available.
Following the incident on April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips' low back problems became worse causing
pain and numbness in his right lower extremity until eventually he experienced right foot drop.
Mr. Phillips ultimately underwent surgery on his low back then returned to work in November
2003 doing refrigeration work for Johnson Controls in Pennsylvania.
D.

Medical Problems Caused by the April 20, 2001 Industrial Accident.

An MRI scan taken of Mr. Phillips' lumbar spine on May 14, 2001 revealed:

Mr. Phillips testified that the compressor weighed between 75 and 90 pounds. I found 80 pounds to be a
reasonable mid range weight between Mr. Phillip's estimated parameters.
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IMPRESSION: 1. Degenerative disc disease at the levels of L4-L5 and L5-S1.
There is evidence of broad-based disc bulge at L5-S1 with an associated focal
center to right component. There is evidence of right lateral recess stenosis, as
well as bilateral neuroforaminal narrowing, right more pronounced than the left.
2. Degenerative disc disease at L4-L5 with broad-based posterior disc bulges
center to the left with evidence of mild canal stenosis. [Exhibit " J - l " at 12].
On December 12, 2002 Dr. John Henrie M.D. took a second MRI scan of Mr. Phillips' lumbar
spine that disclosed:
1. L4-5 grade I-II posterior annular bulge, with a mild grade II left posterolateral
component...
2. L5-S1 focal grade II-III right posterolateral extrusion impinging upon and
displacing the traversing right SI nerve root. [Id. at 10].
Dr. Reed Fogg M.D. operated on Mr. Phillips on January 3, 2003 performing:
Total laminectomy of L4; total laminectomy of L5; foraminotomy of nerve roots
L4, L5 and SI bilateral; lysis of adhesions of SI right; excision of herniated disc
L5-S1 right to include massive inferior free fragment; excision of disc L4-5
central; posterior interbody fusion L4-5; posterior interbody fusion L5-S1;
threaded RAY fusion cages L4-5, 1 6 x 2 1 mm, and L5-S1 14 x 21 mm;
posterolateral fusion L4-5, L5-S1 with pedicle screws L4, L5, SI unilateral on the
right. Universal Spine System construct unilateral on the right; autograph bone,
OsteoSet. [Id. a 166].
On July 10, 2003 Dr. Michael Chung M.D. declared Mr. Phillips to be at medical stability with
respect to his low back problems resulting in surgery as caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial
accident. [Id. at 85]. Dr. Chung rated Mr. Phillips with an 18% whole person impairment due to
his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Id.].
Following his surgery on January 3, 2003 Mr. Phillips continued to suffer from low back pain.
Dr. John Wassil III M.D. saw Mr. Phillips on June 17, 2005 and performed an EMG raising
concerns about movement occurring due to a failing fusion. [Id. at 3].
Mr. Phillips began treating with Dr. Terry Neuendorf D.O. who on May 24, 2005 diagnosed him
with "failed low back syndrome" status post fusion at L4-5, L5-S1." [Id. at 61]. Dr. Neuendorf
also assessed Mr. Phillips with "post-lumbar laminectomy syndrome." [Id.]. Dr. Neuendorf
treated Mr. Phillips with facet injections from May 24, 2005 up through January 10, 2006. [Id. at
46]. On February 7, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf repeated his diagnoses of "failed low back syndrome"
status post fusion at L4-5, L5-S1" with "post-lumbar laminectomy syndrome." [Id. at 45].
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The undisputed medical evidence in this case established that Mr. Phillips' industrial accident on
April 20, 2001 caused him to sustain herniated disks from L4 to SI resulting in surgical
laminectomy, foraminotomy and fusion at the same levels. Ultimately Mr. Phillips suffered from
failed low back syndrome together with post-laminectomy syndrome.
E.

The February 17,2006 Accident

While at work for A-l Refrigeration in Ohio Mr. Phillips held a 28' fiberglass extension ladder
vertically. Mr. Phillips placed his right foot on the bottom rung of the ladder when the wind
caught the ladder forcing him to twist and toss the ladder. Mr. Phillips complained that he felt
like he pulled the muscles his thoracic spine in addition to aggravating his lumbar spine pain
after tossing the ladder. Mr. Phillips testified the ladder weighed 50 pounds. Respondents
presented the expert testimony of James Wellborne a safety manager for Teton Industrial
Construction that 28' fiberglass extension ladders weigh 68 to 70 pounds. The preponderance of
the evidence established that on February 17, 2006 while employed for A-l Refrigeration Mr.
Phillips' hurt his thoracic spine and aggravated his lumbar spine condition when a gust of wind
caught a 28 foot 70 pound fiberglass ladder he held erect vertically forcing him to toss the
ladder.
F.

Medical Cause of Shawn Phillips' Current Lumbar Spine Problems.

On February 21, 2006 Dr. James Weiss diagnosed Mr. Phillips with:
(1) Right L5 radicular pain.
(2) Failed back syndrome. 3
(3) Status post L4-5, L5-S1 pedicle screw fixation on the right. [Exhibit "J-l" at
154].
On May 2, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf opined that incident on February 17, 2006 caused Mr. Phillips to
suffer a new aggravation of his injuries sustained from the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Id.
at 37]. However, on September 5, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf treated Mr. Phillips repeating his prior
diagnoses of "failed low back syndrome" and "post lumbar laminectomy syndrome." [Id. at 32].
In a Summary of Medical Records completed on October 3, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf pronounced Mr.
Phillips' industrial accident on April 20, 2001 as the cause of his ongoing lumbar spine medical
treatment and inability to work. On November 14, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf for the first time
assessed Mr. Phillips with anew problem that of "Thoracic strain and sprain, thoracic
radiculopathy, somatic dysfunction of the thoracic spine." [Id. at 26].

The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Mr. Phillips workers' compensation claim based on the February 17,
2006 accident. [Exhibit "P-2"].
"' Failed back syndrome is a term referring to an "unsuccessful result with back surgery." [Spine-Health.com.].
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Dr. Gerald Moress M.D. evaluated Mr. Phillips on April 3, 2007 and concluded that he suffered
from:
1. Status post L4-S1 posterior lateral interbody fusion with pedicle screws.
2. Failed low back syndrome.
3. L5 and S1 right lower extremity radiculopathy sensory/motor. [Id. at 20].
Dr. Moress then stated:
The incident occurred in February 2006, on the job, apparently aggravated his low
back condition .... Objectively there was no evidence of recurrent herniation or
instability of the fusion.
His examination shows both sensory and motor loss involving the L5 and S1
nerve roots. With the exception of axial loading he passes all the credibility tests.
In summation I would state that Mr. Phillips suffered a permanent injury to his
lumbosacral spine with the injury in 2001. **** The industrial injury would be
considered a liability for ensuing treatment and surgery.
The Cause for his current complaints in the low back and right lower extremity
would be a failed low back syndrome plus L5 and SI nerve root dysfunction in
the form of both motor and sensory loss. There is no evidence that there had been
anatomic change due to the February 17, 2006 injury. However, the February 17,
2006 injury caused a permanent aggravation of his low back condition since he
had been able to work up until that injury. [Id. at 20-21].
The undisputed medical evidence in this case demonstrated that failed low back syndrome
caused Mr. Phillips' current low back problems as aggravated by his accident on February 17,
2006. In other words Mr. Phillips' industrial accident on April 20, 2001 caused the low back
problems leading to surgery on January 3, 2003, the failed low back syndrome and his current
low back problems as aggravated by the incident on February 17, 2006. The failed low back
syndrome and subsequent aggravation of same constituted the natural results of Mr. Phillips'
original industrial injury on April 20, 2001.
G.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation.

No dispute existed that respondents paid Mr. Phillips temporary total disability compensation
from the date of surgery on January 3, 2003 until released to work again in October 2003. Mr.
Phillips claimed entitlement to additional temporary total disability compensation from February
17, 2006 and ongoing until he reached medical stability. Mr. Phillips remained off work from
February 17, 2006 through the date of the hearing in this matter.
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On July 10, 2003 Dr. Chung declared Mr. Phillips medically stable from his low back problems
caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Exhibit " J - l " at 85]. However, as of July 28,
2005 Dr. Neuendorf stated Mr. Phillips had not reached medical stability. [Id. at 55]. On
October 3, 2006 Dr. Neuendorf reiterated that Mr. Phillips had not then arrived at medical
stability with respect to his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident.
On the other hand, Dr. Moress agreed with Dr. Chung in pronouncing Mr. Phillips medical stable
as of July 10, 2003 with respect to his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial
accident. Given the dispute between Dr. Moress, Dr. Chung and Neuendorf, I referred the matter
of when Mr. Phillips reached medical stability as to his low back problems caused by the April
20, 2003 industrial accident to the Medical Panel.
The Medical Panel filed a report on November 13, 2007. The Medical Panel consisted of the
chair, Dr. Alvin Wirthlin M.D. a neurologist, and a panel member, Dr. Glenn Momberger M.D.
an orthopedic surgeon. The Medical Panel reviewed my Interim Order, the Medical Records
Exhibit "J-l" and the radiology films provided by the parties. [Medical Panel Report p. 1]. The
Medical Panel also examined Mr. Phillips. [Id.].
When asked about the date Mr. Phillips reached medical stability as to his low back problems
caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident, the Medical Panel responded that:
In view of the petitioner's continued low back pain, and in view of a 2005 lumbar
CT scan which shows a fusion which is in all likelihood not solid, we agree it is
medically probable that the Petitioner has not reached medical stability. [Id. at p.

7112].
I found the Medical Panel Report thorough, well reasoned and supported by the medical record.
Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Phillips never
reached medical stability with respect to his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001
industrial accident. Therefore the respondents owed Mr. Phillips temporary total disability
compensation from February 17, 2006 to the date of the hearing in this matter May 21, 2007 in
the lump sum amount of $41,286.33. Thereafter, respondents continue to owe Mr. Phillips
temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $631.00 per week until he reaches medical
stability as to the injuries caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident, receives 312 weeks of
benefits or returns to full time employment.
H.

Temporary Partial Disability Compensation.

Mr. Phillips provided no evidence concerning entitlement to temporary partial disability
compensation. Therefore, Mr. Phillips' claim for temporary partial disability compensation must
be dismissed.
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I;

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

On July 10, 2003 Dr. Chung gave Mr. Phillips an 18% whole person impairment related to his
low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Exhibit " J - 1 " at 85].
Nonetheless, Dr. Moress on April 3, 2003 assigned Mr. Phillips a 24% whole person impairment
rating associated with low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Id. at
21]. Given the disagreement between Dr. Moress' and Dr. Chung's impairment ratings I
referred the matter to the Medical Panel for consideration.
As set forth in Section IV.G., Mr. Phillips never achieved medical stability from his low back
problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. Furthermore, the Medical Panel
postulated the possibility of Mr. Phillips requiring a revision of his lumbar fusion surgery.
[Medical Panel Report at p. 7 ^f 2]. Therefore, Mr. Phillips continued to be entitled to temporary
total disability compensation making his claim for permanent partial disability compensation
unripe for determination.
J.

Medical Expenses and Recommended Medical Care.

On April 3, 2007 Dr. Moress opined that:
All the medical care received following the accident of April 20, 2001 has been
reasonable and appropriate. [Exhibit "J-1" at 21].
In his opinion of April 3, 2007 Dr. Moress also endorsed the use of a spinal cord stimulator but
discouraged the use of radiofrequency rhizotomies as appropriate to treat Mr. Phillips lumbar
spine problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. [Id.]. However, Dr. Neuendorf
on May 6, 2007 requested that Mr. Phillips receive radiofrequency denervation in addition to a
lumbar spinal cord stimulator to treat the pain from lumbar spine problems caused by his April
20, 2001 industrial accident. [Exhibit " J - 1 " at 22].
Other than the radio frequency denervation procedure, the uniform medical opinion in this case
sanctioned all medical care received by Mr. Phillips as medically reasonable and necessary for
the treatment of his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident. The
consistent medical opinion in this matter also approved the reasonable medical necessity of a
spinal cord stimulator as reasonable and necessary for the treatment of his low back problems
caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident.

4

Dr. Moress declined apportionment of the 24% impairment rating to any cause other than the April 20, 2001
industrial accident. [Id. at 21].
5
This despite that the Medical Panel gave Mr. Phillips an impairment rating reflecting his condition at this point in
time. Further surgery could likely increase the impairment rating.
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Given the dispute between Dr. Moress and Dr. Neuendorf over the reasonable medical necessity
of the recommended radio frequency denervation or rhizotomy, I referred the matter to the
Medical Panel for consideration. The Medical Panel opined that: "We agree radio frequency
denervation or rhizotomy is not reasonable and necessary medical treatment." [Medical Panel
Report at p. 7 Tf 3]. Again, I found the Medical panel report persuasive. Therefore, as to the use
of radio frequency denervation or rhizotomy, the preponderance of the evidence in this case
demonstrated these modalities not medically reasonable or necessary in the treatment of Mr.
Phillips low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident.
K.

Travel Expense Reimbursement.

Mr. Phillips presented no evidence in support of his claim for travel expense reimbursement.
Therefore, Mr. Phillips' claim for travel expense reimbursement must be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A.

Employment.

Redwood Industries employed Mr. Phillips on April 20, 2001.
B.

Compensation Rate.

As of April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips was married with two dependent children. Mr. Phillips's
compensation with Redwood Industries on April 20, 2001 equaled $24.00 per hour, 40 hours per
week average, yielding the maximum temporary total disability compensation rate of $631.00
per week and the maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate of $421.00 per week.
[$24.00/hour x 40 hours/week - $960.00/wek x 2/3 = $640.00/week].
C.

April 20, 2001 Industrial Accident.

While at work for Redwood Industries at the Kennecott Acid Plant on April 21, 2001 Mr.
Phillips carried an 80 pound compressor up three flights of stairs. As he carried the compressor
up the stairs an apprentice yelled at Mr. Phillips causing him to twist around while carrying the
compressor and hurting his low back. When Mr. Phillips felt the pain in his low back as he
twisted he dropped the compressor and fell to his knees.
Mr. Phillips immediately reported the low back injury to his supervisor at Redwood Industries.
Following the events of April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips took several days off of work. Mr. Phillips
returned to work at full duty because Redwood Industries had no light duty work available.
Following the incident on April 20, 2001 Mr. Phillips' low back problems became worse causing
pain and numbness in his right lower extremity until eventually he experienced right foot drop.
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Mr. Phillips ultimately underwent surgery on his low back then returned to work in November
2003 doing refrigeration work for Johnson Controls in Pennsylvania.
D.

Medical Problems Caused by the April 20, 2001 Industrial Accident.

Mr. Phillips' industrial accident on April 20, 2001 caused him to sustain herniated disks from L4
to SI resulting in surgical laminectomy, foraminotomy and fusion at the same levels. Ultimately
Mr. Phillips suffered from failed low back syndrome together with post-laminectomy syndrome.
E.

The February 17, 2006 Accident.

While employed for A-1 Refrigeration on February 17, 2006 Mr. Phillips' hurt his thoracic spine
and aggravated his lumbar spine condition when a gust of wind caught a 28 foot 70 pound
fiberglass ladder he held erect vertically forcing him to toss the ladder.
F.

Medical Cause of Shawn Phillips' Current Lumbar Spine Problems.

Failed low back syndrome caused Mr. Phillips' current low back problems as aggravated by his
accident on February 17, 2006. In other words Mr. Phillips' industrial accident on April 20,
2001 caused the low back problems leading to surgery on January 3, 2003, the failed low back
syndrome and his current low back problems as aggravated by the incident on February 17,
2006. The failed low back syndrome and subsequent aggravation of same constituted the natural
results of Mr. Phillips' original industrial injury on April 20, 2001.
The Utah Court of Appeals in McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission held that:
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a subsequent aggravation to a
compensable workplace injury, a claimant need only prove that his subsequent
injury .... [is] & natural result o£ [his] compensable primary injury. (Citation
omitted). Furthermore a claimant need not show that his original tragedy was the
sole cause of [his] subsequent injury (Citation omitted). Indeed, if the claimant
can show that the 'initial work-related accident [is merely] a contributing cause of
the subsequent injury,' (Citation omitted), the claimant has met his burden.
McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission, 41 P. 3d 468, 472 (Utah App. 2002).
The Court in McKesson went on to state that:
However, whether or not a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition, once
benefits are properly awarded, the employer is responsible for 'all medical [costs]
resulting from [the compensable] injury,' including costs resulting from
subsequent aggravations to the compensable workplace injury. [Id.].
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The Court in McKesson concluded:
Accordingly, if the claimant successfully establishes that the subsequent injury is
the 'natural result' or consequence of a compensable workplace injury, the
claimant is eligible for additional workers' compensation benefits. [Id. at 473].
The Labor Commission in considering a similar type case quoted Professor Larson:
'When ... the injury following the initial compensable injury does not arise out of
the quasi-course activity, ... the chain of causation may be deemed broken by
either intentional or negligent claimant conduct.' Kimberly Staker v. IHCHome
Care Services Case No. 2003116 (quoting LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW §10.15, p. 10-12).
In the present case Mr. Phillips' industrial accident on April 20, 2001 caused the low back
problems leading to surgery on January 3, 2003, the failed low back syndrome and his current
low back problems as aggravated by the incident on February 17, 2006. The failed low back
syndrome and subsequent aggravation of same constituted the natural results of Mr. Phillips'
original industrial injury on April 20, 2001. Respondents provided no evidence that Mr. Phillips'
conduct in holding a ladder caught by the wind on February 17, 2006 constituted an intentional
or negligent act breaking the chain of causation. Consequently, respondents owed Mr. Phillips
additional workers' compensation benefits consequent to his current low back problems. 6
G.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation.

No dispute existed that respondents paid Mr. Phillips temporary total disability compensation
from the date of surgery on January 3, 2003 until he returned to work again in October 2003.
Mr. Phillips claimed entitled to additional temporary total disability compensation from February
17, 2006 and ongoing until he reached medical stability. Mr. Phillips remained off work from
February 17, 2006 through the date of the hearing in this matter.

Respondents suggested that because the accident on February 17, 2006 came about from a second industrial
accident with another employer the principles in McKesson no longer applied. Respondents cited no authority for
their proposition. Additionally, the Ohio Industrial Commission denied Mr. Phillips' workers' compensation claim
based on the February 17, 2006 event ostensibly removing the matter from categorization as a compensable
workers' compensation claim.
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Mr. Phillips never reached medical stability with respect to his low back problems caused by the
April 20, 2001 industrial accident. Therefore the respondents owed Mr. Phillips temporary total
disability compensation from February 17, 2006 to the date of the hearing in this matter May 21,
2007 m the lump sum amount of $41,286.33. Thereafter, respondents continue to owe Mr.
Phillips temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $631.00 per week until he reaches
medical stability as to the injuries caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident, receives 312
weeks of benefits or returns to full time employment.
H.

Temporary Partial Disability Compensation.

Mr. Phillips provided no evidence concerning entitlement to temporary partial disability
compensation. Therefore, Mr. Phillips' claim for temporary partial disability compensation must
be dismissed.
I.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

Mr. Phillips never achieved medical stability from his low back problems caused by the April 20,
2001 industrial accident. Furthermore, Mr. Phillips faced the possibility of a required revision of
his lumbar fusion surgery. Therefore, Mr. Phillips continued to be entitled to temporary total
disability compensation making his claim for permanent partial disability compensation unripe
for determination.
Except as to radio frequency denervation or rhizotomies, the respondents are responsible for
payment of all medical care received by Mr. Phillips for his low back as medically reasonable
and necessary for the treatment of his low back problems caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial
accident. The respondents are also liable for payment of a spinal cord stimulator as medically
reasonable and necessary for the treatment of his low back problems caused by the April 20,
2001 industrial accident.
VI. ORDER.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Redwood Industries and/or Zurich Insurance Co. shall
pay Shawn P. Phillips temporary total disability compensation from February 17, 2006 to May
21, 2007 at the rate of $631.00 per week for 65.43 weeks, for a total of $41,286.00. Thereafter,
Redwood Industries and/or Zurich Insurance Co. shall continue to pay Shawn Phillips temporary
total disability compensation at the rate of $631.00 per week until he reaches medical stability as
to the injuries caused by the April 20, 2001 industrial accident, receives 312 weeks of benefits or
returns to full time employment. Benefits are paid pursuant to Utah Code §34A-2-410 and Utah
Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shawn P. Phillips' claim for permanent partial disability
compensation is hereby dismissed without prejudice as unripe for determination.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shawn Phillips' claim for temporary partial disability
compensation and reimbursement for travel expenses up through the date of the hearing in this
matter are dismissed with prejudice,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Redwood Industries and/or Zurich Insurance Co. shall pay
all medical expenses reasonably related to Shawn Phillips' industrial accident of April 20, 2001
consistent with this Order and according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and the medical and
surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any travel allowances under Utah
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, under Utah
Code § 34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys' fees of $7,406.70 plus fifteen percent
(15%) of the interest awarded herein, shall be paid directly to Melvin A Cook Esq. according to
Utah Code § 34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That amount shall be
deducted from Shawn P. Phillips' award and sent directly to Melvin A. Cook's office.
DATED THIS 5th day of February 2008.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

SHAWN P. PHILLIPS,
Petitioner,
1

vs.
REDWOOD INDUSTRIES and
ZURICH INSURANCE CO.,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW
Case No. 06-1154

Respondents.

Redwood Industries and its insurance carrier, Zurich Insurance Co. (collectively referred to as
"Redwood") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's
award of benefits to Shawn P. Phillips under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63 G4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Mr. Phillips claims workers' compensation benefits for a low-back injury that occurred on
April 20, 2001, while working for Redwood. Redwood accepted liability for Mr. Phillips's injury
and paid him temporary disability compensation and medical benefits until October 2003 when he
was released to return to work. On February 17, 2006, Mr. Phillips was working for A-l
Refrigeration when he sustained another back injury. The parties dispute whether Mr. Phillips's
current low-back problems were caused by the 2001 accident or the 2006 accident.
Judge La Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on the claim and determined that the
undisputed evidence showed Mr. Phillips's current low-back problems were caused by the 2001
accident. However, certain medical aspects remained unclear and Judge La Jeunesse referred those
questions to an impartial medical panel. The panel opined that it was likely Mr. Phillips had a spinal
fusion that was not solid and he was not medically stable. Judge La Jeunesse adopted the panel's
findings and awarded benefits to Mr. Phillips including the maximum rate of temporary total
disability compensation.
Redwood challenges Judge La Jeunesse's decision by arguing that Mr. Phillips is not entitled
to benefits beyond what it has already paid because the 2006 accident at A-l Refrigeration severed
the causal connection between the 2001 accident at Redwood and his current low-back problems.
Redwood also argues the medical panel's report is inconclusive regarding whether Mr. Phillips is
medically stable. Lastly, Redwood submits that the calculated rate of temporary total disability

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW
SHAWN P. PHILLIPS
PAGE 2 OF 5
compensation is incorrect.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact, which are summarized as
follows. While working for Redwood on April 20, 2001, Mr. Phillips was carrying an 80-pound
compressor up three flights of stairs when he twisted at the waist and felt pain in his low back. Mr.
Phillips attempted to return to work, but his low-back problems became worse and eventually
required surgery to repair disc herniations in his lumbar spine and sacrum, which took place on
January 3, 2003.
Following the surgery, Mr. Phillips consulted with Dr. Wassil regarding his continued lowback pain. Dr. Wassil performed an EMG out of concern over movement in Mr. Phillips's spine due
to a failing fusion from the surgery. Redwood's medical expert, Dr. Chung, evaluated Mr. Phillips
and declared he was medically stable from his work-related low-back injury as of July 10,2003. Dr.
Chung also gave Mr. Phillips a permanent lifting restriction of 25 to 30 pounds. Mr. Phillips was
released to return to regular-duty work in October 2003.
Mr. Phillips began treating with Dr. Neuendorf for his continued low-back pain. Dr.
Neuendorf diagnosed him with failed low-back syndrome in May of 2005. Then, on February 17,
2006, Mr. Phillips was working for A-1 Refrigeration coming down off a large 70-pound ladder
when a gust of wind caught the ladder, causing Mr. Phillips to twist his back as he pushed the ladder
aside to prevent it from hitting a parked car.
Dr. Neuendorf treated Mr. Phillips following the second accident and opined that he was not
medically stable. Dr. Neuendorf concluded that Mr. Phillips's continued low-back problems were
caused by the 2001 accident and aggravated by the 2006 accident. Redwood's medical expert, Dr.
Moress, also found that the 2001 accident caused Mr. Phillips's current low-back problems, as it
resulted in failed low back syndrome and nerve root dysfunction that were permanently aggravated
by the 2006 accident.
An impartial medical panel was asked to consider whether Mr. Phillips had reached medical
stability. The panel opined that, after reviewing a CT scan of Mr. Phillips's lumbar spine done in
2005, it appeared Mr. Phillips had a fusion of vertebrae that was not solid. The panel found it
medically probable that Mr. Phillips had not reached medical stability, but also noted that further
investigation was needed to verify that the spinal fusion was not solid.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
I.

Causal Connection
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[t]o qualify for additional benefits after suffering a
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subsequent aggravation to a compensable workplace injury, a claimant need only prove that his
subsequent injury is a natural result of his compensable primary injury... if the claimant can show
that the initial work-related accident is merely a contributing cause of the subsequent injury, the
claimant has met his burden." McKesson Corp. v. Labor Com'n, 41 P.3d 468, 472 (Utah App.
2002)(internal citations omitted). However, the subsequent injury is not deemed causally connected
to employment if it results from intentional or negligent conduct by the injured worker. See 1 A.
Larson The Law of Workmen's Compensation §10.15 (1985).
Redwood argues that Mr. Phillips's current low-back problems are not causally connected to
his employment with Redwood because he intentionally worked in refrigeration, an area that required
him to lift heavy objects in violation of the permanent lifting restriction given by Dr. Chung.
Redwood contends that Mr. Phillips's decision to carry and manipulate a 70-pound ladder was
sufficiently negligent to sever the causal connection because he violated a permanent 25 to 30-pound
lifting restriction.
The appropriate test is whether Mr. Phillips was acting rashly or negligently at the time of the
subsequent injury. See Intermountain Health Care v. Bd. of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 846 (Utah App.
1992). There is no evidence that Mr. Phillips was acting rashly or negligently when he was injured
in 2006. The injury occurred by chance when a gust of wind caught hold of a ladder that Mr. Phillips
was using, which caused him to twist his back and aggravate his previous low-back injury. The
medical evidence shows that Mr. Phillips's current low-back problems are the result of failed low
back syndrome and nerve root dysfunction caused by the 2001 accident As a result, Mr. Phillips has
shown that his current condition is causally connected to the 2001 accident and his employment with
Redwood.
II.

Medical Stability

Redwood contends that Mr. Phillips is not entitled to ongoing temporary disability
compensation because the evidence is inconclusive regarding whether Mr. Phillips is medically
stable. Redwood argues that the medical panel lacked sufficient objective evidence to declare
whether Mr. Phillips reached medical stability. However, the panel's report contains the clear
opinion that "it is medically probable that [Mr. Phillips] has not reached medical stability." The
medical panel based this opinion on the results of a CT scan that showed a spinal fusion that did not
appear solid.
Dr. Wassil also noted that movement in Mr. Phillips's spine demonstrated a failing spinal
fusion. Dr. Wassil's opinion combined with the medical panel's report represents a preponderance
of the evidence that Mr. Phillips is not medically stable because of a failing spinal fusion. Because
the evidence shows that Mr. Phillips is not medically stable, the Commission concurs with Judge La
Jeunesse's decision to award continuing temporary disability compensation.
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III.

Calculation of Temporary Disability Compensation

Redwood submits that Mr. Phillips's rate of temporary disability compensation was
calculated incorrectly. Specifically, Redwood asserts that Mr. Phillips's compensation rate should be
$529 per week rather than $631 per week. After reviewing the maximum amount payable for the
date of the original accident, April 20, 2001, the Commission agrees with Redwood that Mr.
Phillips's rate of temporary disability compensation should be $529 per week as he qualified for the
maximum weekly rate.
ORDER
The Commission alters Judge La Jeunesse's decision of February 5, 2008, as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Redwood Industries and/or Zurich Insurance Co. shall pay Shawn
P. Phillips temporary total disability compensation from February 17, 2006 to May 21, 2007 at the
rate of $529.00 per week for 65.43 weeks, for a total of $34,612.00. Thereafter, Redwood Industries
and/or Zurich Insurance Co. shall continue to pay Mr. Phillips temporary total disability
compensation at the rate of $529.00 per week until he reaches medical stability as to the injuries
caused by the April 20, 2001 accident, receives 312 weeks of benefits or returns to full-time
employment pursuant to Utah Code §34A-2-410 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
The Commission affirms the remaining portions of Judge La Jeunesse's Order.
Dated this JZ7

day of January, 2011.

Utah Labor Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review•ftin the matter of Shawn P.
s, Case
I 06-1154, was mailed first class postage prepaid this £/_ day of January, 2011, to
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Case No.
the following:
Shawn P Phillips
90 Hamilton Ave 1
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Redwood Industries
758 S Redwood Rd
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Zurich Insurance Co
Designated Agent
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Melvin A Cook Esq
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Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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THOMAS C. STURDY (3148)
KRISTY L. BERTELSEN (8148)
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.
Attorneys for Respondents
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-7900

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

SHAWN PHILLIPS
Petitioner,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.

Case No. 06-1154
Honorable Richard M. LaJeunesse

REDWOOD INDUSTRIES and
ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY
Respondents.

Respondents, Redwood Industries and/or Zurich Insurance Company, by and through
counsel of record Thomas C. Sturdy and Kristy L. Bertelsen, file the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
63G-4-302 and Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-1M as follows:
BACKGROUND
Petitioner injured his low back while working for Redwood on April 21, 2001 when he
twisted while carrying an 80 pound compressor up a flight of stairs. Petitioner returned to work
at regular duty as a refrigeration technician for a new employer. MRE p. 73. He eventually
moved to Ohio where he re-injured his back while working for a new employer, A-l
Refrigeration, on February 17, 2006 while manipulating a 70 pound ladder.
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The ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order. A medical
panel opined that Petitioner was not yet medically stable from the April 20, 2001 accident.
However, the medical panel did not opine (nor was it asked to opine) on the issue of
apportionment of medical expenses among each of the industrial accidents.
The ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, which found that the
accident on April 20, 2001 was liable for medical and indemnity compensation. The ALJ applied
McKesson v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah Ct App. 2002) in applying a direct and
natural consequence analysis to this case, despite the fact that this case involved two industrial
accidents. The ALJ ruled that the subsequent February 1, 2006 industrial accident was not the
result of an intentional or negligent act by petitioner, and concluded that petitioner's lumbar back
pain after the February 17, 2006 accident was the natural result of his industrial injury of April 1,
2001. The Commission has entered an Order on Motion for Review affirming the ALJ's Order
and also applying McKesson v. Labor Commission, despite the fact that this case involves two
industrial accidents.
ARGUMENT
THE ALJ AND COMMISSIONS ORDERS ARE IN ERROR SINCE THEY APPLIED A
"DIRECT AND NATURAL CONSEQUENCE" ANALYSIS.

Reconsideration of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review is appropriate given
the incorrect legal analysis applied by both the ALJ and the Commission. The undisputed facts
of this case reveal that Petitioner was involved in two industrial accidents. The first accident
with Redwood Industries occurred on April 20, 2001. The second accident occurred on February
17, 2006 working for A-l Refrigeration.
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Both the ALJ and Commission's Orders apply a direct and natural consequences analysis
outlined in McKesson v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 10. However, McKesson and its
progeny are not the applicable legal standard when a claimant is involved in two industrial
accidents. Rather, McKesson is applicable only when there is an initial compensable industrial
accident followed by a non-industrial event or aggravation. Such is not the case here. Indeed,
McKesson does not apply when the court is evaluating liability between two industrial accidents.
The Utah Court of Appeals held in McKesson Corporation vs. Labor Commission:
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a subsequent
aggravation to a compensable work place injury, a claimant need
only prove that his subsequent injury is a natural result of his
compensable primary injury. [Footnote] Stated more precisely, the
claimant must establish that the subsequent aggravation is causally
linked to the primary compensable injury. Furthermore, a
claimant need not show that his original tragedy was the sole cause
of his subsequent injury. Indeed, if the claimant can show that the
initial work related accident is merely a contributing cause of this
subsequent injury, the claimant has met his burden.

In McKesson , the court held that a claimant's subsequent non industrial injury to his
neck while entering his own motor vehicle was the direct and natural consequence of his initial
primary injury and, therefore, awarded additional workers' compensation benefits. In that case,
the claimant had sustained a compensable head injury after being struck in the head by a 14pound case and suffered two herniated discs. Following that accident, the claimant attempted to
pull himself up into his pick-up truck and hit his head on the truck's door frame, aggravating his
neck injury. The employer argued that this subsequent non-industrial accident essentially broke
the chain of medical causation, relieving the employer of additional workers' compensation
benefits. The Commission and the Court of Appeals disagreed and found that the subsequent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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injury occurred after a "simple accident brought on by ordinary error and unintentional
miscalculation." Thus, the Commission concluded that the subsequent non-industrial injury was
a natural result of his compensable work place injury, insufficient to relieve the employer of
financial responsibility. The court held that nothing in the record suggested that the claimant's
subsequent injury resulted from "unreasonable conduct".
There is overwhelming Utah Labor Commission precedent stating that McKesson does
not apply when the court is evaluating liability among two industrial accidents. Respondents
refer the Commission to the following sampling of Utah Labor Commission cases on point
For example, in Myhaver v. ASAP Organization, Case No. 03-0843 (May 9, 2006), the
Utah Labor Commission specifically held that McKesson's direct and natural consequences
analysis does not apply when the case presents with two work related injuries. In Myhaver, the
claimant attempted to argue that McKesson applied and did not allow apportionment between
employers. However, the Commission found the claimant's argument incorrect and stated:
However, McKesson dealt with a different issue — whether a worker who has
suffered a first work related injury is entitled to additional benefits for a
subsequent non-industrial aggravation of the primary injury. McKessondid not
deal with the situation presented here of two work related injuries, each
compensable in its own right, which act together to necessitate medical
treatment.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in U.S.F & G. v. Industrial Commission, 657
P.2d 764, 767 (Utah 1983) is more closely relevant to Mr. Myhaver's
circumstances. In U.S.F. & G., the worker had two accidents while employed by
the same employer, but the employer had different insurance carriers at the time of
each accident. The Industrial Commission apportioned liability for medical care
between the two carriers. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted apportionment
under such circumstances, [*5] but remanded the case for the Industrial
Commission to obtain a medical panel opinion as to what the proper
apportionment should be.
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In Mr. Myhaver's case, Judge Sessions' apportionment is based on a medical panel
opinion, thereby satisfying the objection that prompted a remand in U.S.F. & G.
And although U.S.F. & G dealt with apportionment between two insurance
carriers, the Commission sees no reason why the same principle should not
apply between two employers.

2006 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 50, 4-5 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2006). See also Powers v. Providian
Financial, 04-0829 (Jan. 20, 2006) (applying McKesson to subsequent non-industrial accident
only).
Likewise, in Maloney v. Highland Care Center, 00-1084 (June 30, 2003), the
Commission noted that a direct and natural consequences analysis does not apply when there are
two industrial accidents. There, the claimant had one industrial accident in Utah and another out
of state. There, Commission held:
The Commission also notes Highlands final argument that Judge Hann should
have determined whether Ms. Maloney's accident of May 6, 2000, was f,a direct
and natural consequence of the earlier 1994 accident." The Commission believes
that Highland's argument is based on a misinterpretation of the Utah Court [*7]
of Appeals recent decision in McKesson v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah
App. 2002), as well as the Commission's previous decisions. But in any event, the
medical panel's report establishes that there is no connection between the two
accidents. Consequently, even if the "direct and natural" test were applicable here,
which it is not, the second accident cannot be viewed as the direct and natural
consequence of the first accident.
2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 149 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2003).
The Commission also held similarly in DeMille v. Thurston Cable, 00-1059 (May 30,
2003), that McKesson'$ direct and natural consequences analysis does not apply when there are
two industrial accidents. The Commission held:
Although Thurston cites the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision in McKesson
v. Lieberman, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002) to support its argument, McKesson
involved a non-work aggravation of a work-related injury. The Court of
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Appeals1 analysis of that situation is not applicable to a case such as this,
where there have been two separate work accidents, the last of which
removes the worker from the workforce.

2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 87 (UT Wrk. Comp. 2003).
This principle is also reiterated in Nelson v. Northwest Transport, 01-0068, 01-0069
(May 1, 2003). There, the Commission first evaluated if there were two industrial accidents. The
Commission opined that there was only one compensable accident. Therefore, the Commission
found it appropriate to apply McKesson v. Labor Commission to address the extent of that
employer's continuing liability.
Respondents ask the Commission to reconsider its ruling and remand this case to the ALJ
to apply the correct legal standard. The court should apply U.S.F.& G v. Industrial

Commission,

657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) and its progeny to evaluate apportionment of medical expenses
between these industrial accidents since this case involved a claimed who was involved in two
industrial accident. With regard to indemnity benefits, the applicable legal standards are
properly articulated in both Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and in
Duane Brown Cheverolet v. Industrial Commission, 511 P.2d 743 (Utah 1973) and its progeny1.
Under Allen, the court should evaluate both legal causation and medical causation for these
accidents. Moreover, in Duane Brown the Court stated that indemnity compensation for the
same period of time cannot be apportioned among multiple insurers. There, the Court found that

X

SMJ. v. Geneva Steel Case No. 99-0010 (9/25/02). Holding that USF&G applies to
apportion medical expenses between original injury and subsequent industrial aggravation and
Duane Brown applies to the evaluation of liability for disability compensation involving multiple
industrial accidents.
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the last injury aggravated the prior disability and, therefore, was fully liable for disability
compensation. The court should apply that analysis here.
DATED this'_J_ day of February, 2011.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.

Thomas C. Sturdy
Kristy L. Bertelsen
Attorneys for Respondents
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Commissioner
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
SHAWN P. PHILLIPS,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

REDWOOD INDUSTRIES and
ZURICH INSURANCE CO,

Case No. 06-1154

Respondents.

Redwood Industries and its insurance carrier, Zurich Insurance Co., (collectively referred to
as "Redwood") ask the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision awarding benefits to
Shawn P. Phillips under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code
Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §63G-4-302 of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Redwood requests reconsideration of the Commission's order awarding benefits to Mr.
Phillips. On April 20, 2001, Mr. Phillips sustained a compensable low-back injury while working
for Redwood. Redwood accepted liability for the injury and paid Mr. Phillips the appropriate
benefits. Then, on February 17, 2006, Mr. Phillips was working for A-l Refrigeration when he
aggravated1 the low-back injury he had sustained while working for Redwood.
Judge La Jeunesse awarded benefits according to McKesson Corp. v. Labor Com >2,41 P.3d
468,472 (Utah App. 2002) because Mr. Phillips's low-back problems in 2006 were due to the 2001
industrial accident with Redwood. Redwood appealed, and the Commission affirmed Judge La
Jeunesse's award.
Redwood now seeks reconsideration of the Commission's order by arguing that the standard
articulated in McKesson does not apply to Mr. Phillips's claim because he suffered two separate
industrial injuries. Redwood contends that Commission precedent requires an apportionment of
benefits between the two alleged injuries.

In the Commission's Order on Motion for Review, the Commission imprecisely described the 2006
event as "another back injury." However, the Commission's reasoning in its decision was based on
the fact that the 2006 event was an aggravation of Mr. Phillips's previous low-back injury, and not a
separate injury.
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DISCUSSION
Redwood argues that the standard in McKesson does not apply to Mr. Phillips's claim
because McKesson involved a non-industrial aggravation of a compensable industrial injury, whereas
Mr. Phillips's aggravation occurred while he was working for another employer. However, there is
nothing in McKesson limiting its application to non-industrial aggravations as opposed to those
occurring in the workplace. Mr. Phillips sustained his compensable injury in 2001 while working for
Redwood. Then, in 2006, Mr. Phillips aggravated the same injury. The undisputed evidence shows
Mr. Phillips did not sustain a separate compensable injury, but merely aggravated the primary injury
for which Redwood remains liable. The Commission finds that the McKesson standard applies to
Mr. Phillips's claim, and confirms its previous decision.
ORDER
The Commission denies Redwood's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this £?

f^—
day of March, 2011.

(

<^)k—:
Sheme Hayashi
Ufah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request For Reconsideration irr the
matter of Shawn P Phillips, Case No. 06-1154, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this ffl day
of March, 2011, to the following:
Shawn P Phillips
90 Hamilton Ave 1
Poland OH 44514
Redwood Industries
758 S Redwood Rd
Salt Lake City UT 84104
Zurich Insurance Co
Designated Agent
1400 American Ln
SchaumburgIL 60196
Melvin A Cook Esq
139 ES Temple Ste 300
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Thomas Sturdy Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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